Disentangling Adversarial Robustness and Generalization by Stutz, David et al.
Disentangling Adversarial Robustness and Generalization
David Stutz1 Matthias Hein2 Bernt Schiele1
1Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarland Informatics Campus, Saarbru¨cken
3University of Tu¨bingen, Tu¨bingen
{david.stutz,schiele}@mpi-inf.mpg.de, matthias.hein@uni-tuebingen.de
Abstract
Obtaining deep networks that are robust against adver-
sarial examples and generalize well is an open problem. A
recent hypothesis [102, 95] even states that both robust and
accurate models are impossible, i.e., adversarial robustness
and generalization are conflicting goals. In an effort to clar-
ify the relationship between robustness and generalization,
we assume an underlying, low-dimensional data manifold
and show that: 1. regular adversarial examples leave the
manifold; 2. adversarial examples constrained to the mani-
fold, i.e., on-manifold adversarial examples, exist; 3. on–
manifold adversarial examples are generalization errors,
and on-manifold adversarial training boosts generaliza-
tion; 4. regular robustness and generalization are not nec-
essarily contradicting goals. These assumptions imply that
both robust and accurate models are possible. However,
different models (architectures, training strategies etc.) can
exhibit different robustness and generalization characteris-
tics. To confirm our claims, we present extensive experi-
ments on synthetic data (with known manifold) as well as
on EMNIST [19], Fashion-MNIST [106] and CelebA [59].
1. Introduction
Adversarial robustness describes a deep network’s abil-
ity to defend against adversarial examples [97], impercep-
tibly perturbed images causing mis-classification. These
adversarial attacks pose severe security threats, as demon-
strated against Clarifai.com [58, 8] or Google Cloud Vi-
sion [38]. Despite these serious risks, defenses against such
attacks have been largely ineffective; only adversarial train-
ing, i.e., training on adversarial examples [62, 31], has been
shown to work well in practice [6, 5] – at the cost of compu-
tational overhead and reduced accuracy. Overall, the prob-
lem of adversarial robustness is left open and poorly under-
stood – even for simple datasets such as EMNIST [19] and
Fashion-MNIST [106].
The phenomenon of adversarial examples itself, i.e.,
their mere existence, has also received considerable atten-
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Figure 1: Adversarial examples, and their (normalized) dif-
ference to the original image, in the context of the underly-
ing manifold, e.g., class manifolds “5” and “6” on EMNIST
[19], allow to study their relation to generalization. Regular
adversarial examples are not constrained to the manifold, cf.
(a), and often result in (seemingly) random noise patterns;
in fact, we show that they leave the manifold. However, ad-
versarial examples on the manifold can be found as well,
cf. (b), resulting in meaningful manipulations of the image
content; however, care needs to be taken that the actual, true
label wrt. the manifold does not change, cf. (c).
tion. Recently, early explanations, e.g., attributing adver-
sarial examples to “rare pockets” of the classification sur-
face [97] or linearities in deep networks [31], have been
superseded by the manifold assumption [28, 99]: adver-
sarial examples are assumed to leave the underlying, low-
dimensional but usually unknown data manifold. However,
only [92] provide experimental evidence supporting this as-
sumption. Yet, on a simplistic toy dataset, Gilmer et al.
[28] also found adversarial examples on the manifold, as
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also tried on real datasets [93, 11, 110], rendering the man-
ifold assumption questionable. Still, the manifold assump-
tion fostered research on novel defenses [40, 72, 82].
Beyond the existence of adversarial examples, their re-
lation to generalization is an important open problem. Re-
cently, it has been argued [102, 95] that there exists an in-
herent trade-off, i.e., robust and accurate models seem im-
possible. While Tsipras et al. [102] provide a theoretical
argument on a toy dataset, Su et al. [95] evaluate the robust-
ness of different models on ImageNet [79]. However, these
findings have to be questioned given the results in [28, 77]
showing the opposite, i.e., better generalization helps ro-
bustness.
In order to address this controversy, and in contrast to
[102, 96, 77], we consider adversarial robustness in the con-
text of the underlying manifold. In particular, to break the
hypothesis down, we explicitly ask whether adversarial ex-
amples leave, or stay on, the manifold. On EMNIST, for ex-
ample, considering the class manifolds for “5” and “6”, as
illustrated in Fig. 1, adversarial examples are not guaranteed
to lie on the manifold, cf. Fig. 1 (a). Adversarial examples
can, however, also be constrained to the manifold, cf. Fig. 1
(b); in this case, it is important to ensure that the adversarial
examples do not actually change their label, i.e., are more
likely to be a “6” than a “5”, as in Fig. 1 (c). For clarity, we
refer to unconstrained adversarial examples, as illustrated
in Fig. 1 (a), as regular adversarial examples; in contrast to
adversarial examples constrained to the manifold, so-called
on-manifold adversarial examples.
Contributions: Based on this distinction between regular
robustness, i.e., against regular, unconstrained adversarial
examples, and on-manifold robustness, i.e., against adver-
sarial examples constrained to the manifold, we show:
1. regular adversarial examples leave the manifold;
2. adversarial examples constrained to the manifold, i.e.,
on-manifold adversarial examples, exist and can be
computed using an approximation of the manifold;
3. on-manifold robustness is essentially generalization;
4. and regular robustness and generalization are not nec-
essarily contradicting goals, i.e., for any arbitrary but
fixed model, better generalization through additional
training data does not worsen robustness.
We conclude that both robust and accurate models are pos-
sible and can, e.g., be obtained through adversarial train-
ing on larger training sets. Additionally, we propose on-
manifold adversarial training to boost generalization in set-
tings where the manifold is known, can be approximated,
or invariances of the data are known. We present exper-
imental results on a novel MNIST-like, synthetic dataset
with known manifold, as well as on EMNIST [19], Fashion-
MNIST [106] and CelebA [59]. We will make our code and
data publicly available.
2. Related Work
Attacks: Adversarial examples for deep networks were first
reported in [97]; the problem of adversarial machine learn-
ing, however, has already been studied earlier [9]. Adver-
sarial attacks on deep networks range from white-box at-
tacks [97, 31, 50, 71, 66, 62, 14, 78, 21, 60], with full ac-
cess to the model (weights, gradients etc.), to black-box at-
tacks [17, 10, 96, 39, 80, 67], with limited access to model
queries. White-box attacks based on first-order optimiza-
tion, e.g., [62, 14], are considered state-of-the-art. Due to
their transferability [58, 108, 70], these attacks can also
be used in a black-box setting (e.g. using model stealing
[87, 70, 101, 103, 69, 44]) and have, thus, become standard
for evaluation. Recently, generative models have also been
utilized to craft – or learn – more natural adversarial exam-
ples [93, 11, 110, 82]. Finally, adversarial examples have
been applied to a wide variety of tasks, also beyond com-
puter vision, e.g., [27, 18, 98, 49, 37, 56, 2, 16].
Defenses: Proposed defenses include detection and rejec-
tion methods [32, 26, 55, 61, 3, 63], pre-processing, quan-
tization and dimensionality reduction methods [12, 73, 7],
manifold-projection methods [40, 72, 82, 86], methods
based on stochasticity/regularization or adapted architec-
tures [109, 7, 68, 88, 35, 43, 76, 45, 51, 107], ensemble
methods [57, 94, 34, 100], as well as adversarial training
[109, 65, 36, 83, 90, 54, 62]; however, many defenses have
been broken, often by considering “specialized” or novel
attacks [13, 15, 5, 6]. In [6], only adversarial training, e.g.,
the work by Madry et al. [62], has been shown to be effec-
tive – although many recent defenses have not been studied
extensively. Manifold-based methods, in particular, have
received some attention lately: in [40, 72], generative ad-
versarial networks [30] are used to project an adversarial
example back to the learned manifold. Similarly, in [82],
variational auto-encoders [48] are used to perform robust
classification.
Generalization: Research also includes independent
benchmarks of attacks and defenses [13, 15, 5, 6, 85],
their properties [58, 84], as well as theoretical questions
[35, 43, 23, 99, 28, 88, 102, 104]. Among others, the ex-
istence of adversarial examples [97, 31, 99] raises many
questions. While Szegedy et al. [97] originally thought
of adversarial examples as “extremely” rare negatives and
Goodfellow et al. [31] attributed adversarial examples to the
linearity in deep networks, others argued against these as-
sumptions [28, 99]. Instead, a widely accepted theory is the
manifold assumption; adversarial examples are assumed to
leave the data manifold [28, 99, 40, 72, 82].
This paper is particularly related to work on the connec-
tion of adversarial examples to generalization [102, 95, 28,
77]. Tsipras et al. [102] and Su et al. [95] argue that there
exists an inherent trade-off between robustness and gen-
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Figure 2: Regular and on-manifold adversarial examples on our synthetic dataset, FONTS, consisting of randomly trans-
formed characters “A” to “J”, EMNIST [19], F-MNIST [106] and CelebA [59]. On FONTS, the manifold is known by
construction; in the other cases, the class manifolds have been approximated using VAE-GANs [52, 75]. The difference (nor-
malized; or their magnitude on CelebA) to the original test image reveals the (seemingly) random noise patterns of regular
adversarial examples in contrast to reasonable concept changes of on-manifold adversarial examples.
eralization. However, the theoretical argument in [102] is
questionable as adversarial examples are allowed to change
their actual, true label wrt. the data distribution, as illus-
trated Fig. 1 (c). The experimental results obtained in
[95, 77] stem from comparing different architectures and
training strategies; in contrast, we consider robustness and
generalization for any arbitrary but fixed model. On a sim-
ple synthetic toy dataset, Gilmer et al. [28] show that on-
manifold adversarial examples exist. We further show that
on-manifold adversarial examples also exist on real datasets
with unknown manifold, similar to [110]. In contrast to
[28, 110], we utilize a gradient-based attack on the mani-
fold, not in image space. Our work is also related to [25] and
[65, 64] where variants of adversarial training are used to
boost (semi-)supervised learning. While, e.g., Fawzi et al.
[25], apply adversarial training to image transformations,
we further perform adversarial training on adversarial ex-
amples constrained to the true, or approximated, manifold.
This is also different from adversarial data augmentation
schemes driven by GANs, e.g., [74, 91, 4, 20], where train-
ing examples are generated, but without the goal to be mis-
classified. Finally, [92] provide experimental evidence that
adversarial examples have low probability under the data
distribution; we show that adversarial examples have, in
fact, zero probability.
3. Disentangling Adversarial Robustness
and Generalization
To clarify the relationship between adversarial robust-
ness and generalization, we explicitly distinguish between
regular and on-manifold adversarial examples, as illustrated
in Fig. 1. Then, the hypothesis [102, 95] that robustness
and generalization are contradicting goals is challenged in
four arguments: regular unconstrained adversarial examples
leave the manifold; adversarial examples constrained to the
manifold exist; robustness against on-manifold adversarial
examples is essentially generalization; robustness against
regular adversarial examples is not influenced by general-
ization when controlled through the amount of training data.
Altogether, our results imply that adversarial robustness and
generalization are not opposing objectives and both robust
and accurate models are possible but require higher sample
complexity.
3.1. Experimental Setup
Datasets: We use EMNIST [19], F(ashion)-MNIST [106]
and CelebA [59] for our experiments (240k/40k, 60k/10k
and 182k/20k training/test images); CelebA has been re-
sized to 56×48 and we classify “Male” vs. “Female”. Our
synthetic dataset, FONTS, consists of letters “A” to “J” of
1000 Google Fonts randomly transformed (uniformly over
translation, shear, scale, rotation in [−0.2, 0.2], [−0.5, 0.5],
[0.75, 1.15], [−pi/2, pi/2]) using a spatial transformer network
[42] such that the generation process is completely differen-
tiable. The latent variables correspond to the transformation
parameters, font and class. We generated 960k/40k (bal-
anced) training/test images of size 28×28.
We consider classifiers with three (four on CelebA) con-
volutional layers (4 × 4 kernels; stride 2; 16, 32, 64 chan-
nels), each followed by ReLU activations and batch normal-
ization [41], and two fully connected layers. The networks
are trained using ADAM [47], with learning rate 0.01 (de-
cayed by 0.95 per epoch), weight decay 0.0001 and batch
size 100, for 20 epochs. Most importantly, to control their
generalization performance, we useN training images, with
N between 250 and 40k; for eachN , we train 5 models with
random weight initialization [29] an report averages.
We learn class-specific VAE-GANs, similar to [52, 75],
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Figure 3: Distance of adversarial examples to the true,
on FONTS (left), or approximated, on EMNIST (right),
manifold. We show normalized histograms of the L2
distance of adversarial examples to their projections onto
the manifold (4377/3837 regular adversarial examples on
FONTS/EMNIST; 667 on-manifold adversarial examples
on EMNIST). Regular adversarial examples exhibit a sig-
nificant distance to the manifold; on EMNIST, clearly dis-
tinguishable from on-manifold adversarial examples.
to approximate the underlying manifold; we refer to the
supplementary material for details.
Attack: Given an image-label pair (x, y) from an unknown
data distribution p and a classifier f , an adversarial exam-
ple is a perturbed image x˜ = x + δ which is mis-classified
by the model, i.e., f(x˜) 6= y. While our results can be
confirmed using other attacks and norms (see the supple-
mentary material for [14] and transfer attacks), for clarity,
we concentrate on the L∞ white-box attack by Madry et al.
[62] that directly maximizes the training loss,
max
δ
L(f(x+ δ), y) s.t. ‖δ‖∞ ≤ , x˜i ∈ [0, 1], (1)
using projected gradient descent; where L is the cross-
entropy loss and x˜ = x + δ. The -constraint is meant
to ensure perceptual similarity. We run 40 iterations of
ADAM [47] with learning rate 0.005 and consider 5 restarts,
(distance and direction) uniformly sampled in the -ball for
 = 0.3. Optimization is stopped as soon as the predicted
label changes, i.e., f(x˜) 6= y. We attack 1000 test images.
Adversarial Training: An established defense is adversar-
ial training, i.e., training on adversarial examples crafted
during training [109, 65, 36, 83, 90, 54, 62]. Madry et al.
[62] consider the min-max problem
min
w
N∑
n=1
max
‖δ‖∞≤,xn,i+δi∈[0,1]
L(f(xn+δ;w), yn) (2)
where w are the classifier’s weights and xn the training im-
ages. As shown in the supplementary material, we consid-
ered different variants [97, 31, 62]; in the paper, however,
we follow common practice and train on 50% clean images
and 50% adversarial examples [97]. For  = 0.3, the at-
tack (for the inner optimization problem) is run for full 40
iterations, i.e., is not stopped at the first adversarial example
found. Robustness of the obtained network is measured by
computing the attack success rate, i.e., the fraction of suc-
cessful attacks on correctly classified test images, as, e.g.,
in [14], for a fixed ; lower success rate indicates higher
robustness of the network.
3.2. Adversarial Examples Leave the Manifold
The idea of adversarial examples leaving the manifold
is intuitive on EMNIST where particular background pix-
els are known to be constant, see Fig. 2. If an adversarial
example x˜ manipulates these pixels, it has zero probability
under the data distribution and its distance to the manifold,
i.e., the distance to its projection pi(x˜) onto the manifold,
should be non-zero. On FONTS, with known generative
process in the form of a decoder dec mapping latent vari-
ables z to images x, the projection is obtained iteratively:
pi(x˜) = dec(z˜) with z˜ = argmin z ‖dec(z) − x˜)‖2 and z
constrained to valid transformations (font and class, known
from the test image x, stay constant). On EMNIST, as il-
lustrated in Fig. 4 (right), the manifold is approximated us-
ing 50 nearest neighbors; the projection pi(x˜) onto the sub-
space spanned by the x-centered nearest neighbors is com-
puted through least squares. On both FONTS and EMNIST,
the distance ‖x˜−pi(x˜)‖2 is considered to asses whether the
adversarial example x˜ actually left the manifold.
On FONTS, Fig. 3 (left) shows that regular adversarial
examples clearly exhibit non-zero distance to the manifold.
In fact, the projections of these adversarial examples to the
manifold are almost always the original test images; as a re-
sult, the distance to the manifold is essentially the norm of
the corresponding perturbation: ‖x˜−pi(x˜)‖2 ≈ ‖x˜−x‖2 =
‖δ‖2. This suggests that the adversarial examples leave the
manifold in an almost orthogonal direction. On EMNIST,
in Fig. 3 (right), these results can be confirmed in spite of
the crude local approximation of the manifold. Again, regu-
lar adversarial examples seem to leave the manifold almost
orthogonally, i.e., their distance to the manifold coincides
with the norm of the corresponding perturbations. These re-
sults show that regular adversarial examples essentially are
off-manifold adversarial examples; this finding is intuitive
as for well-trained classifiers, leaving the manifold should
be the “easiest” way to fool it; results on F-MNIST as well
as a more formal statement of this intuition can be found in
the supplementary material.
3.3. On-Manifold Adversarial Examples
Given that regular adversarial examples leave the man-
ifold, we intend to explicitly compute on-manifold adver-
sarial examples. To this end, we assume our data dis-
tribution p(x, y) to be conditional on the latent variables
z, i.e., p(x, y|z), corresponding to the underlying, low-
dimensional manifold. On this manifold, however, there
is no notion of “perceptual similarity” in order to ensure
label invariance, i.e., distinguish valid on-manifold adver-
sarial examples, Fig. 1 (b), from invalid ones that change
the actual, true label, Fig. 1 (c):
Definition 1 (On-Manifold Adversarial Example). Given
the data distribution p, an on-manifold adversarial exam-
ple for x with label y is a perturbed version x˜ such that
f(x˜) 6= y but p(y|x˜) > p(y′|x˜)∀y′ 6= y.
Note that the posteriors p(y|x˜) correspond to the true, un-
known data distribution; any on-manifold adversarial exam-
ple x˜ violating Def. 1 changed its actual, true label.
In practice, we assume access to an encoder and decoder
modeling the (class-conditional) distributions p(z|x, y) and
p(x|z, y) – in our case, achieved using VAE-GANs [52, 75].
Then, given the encoder enc and decoder dec and as illus-
trated in Fig. 4 (left), we obtain the latent code z = enc(x)
and compute the perturbation ζ by maximizing:
max
ζ
L(f(dec(z + ζ)), y) s.t. ‖ζ‖∞ ≤ η. (3)
The image-constraint, i.e., dec(z + ζ) ∈ [0, 1], is enforced
by the decoder; the η-constraint can, again, be enforced by
projection; and we can additionally enforce a constraint on
z + ζ, e.g., corresponding to a prior on z. Label invariance,
as in Def. 1, is ensured by considering only class-specific
encoders and decoders, i.e., the data distribution is approxi-
mated per class. We use η = 0.3 and the same optimization
procedure as for Eq. (1); on approximated manifolds, the
perturbation z + ζ is additionally constrained to [−2, 2]10,
corresponding to a truncated normal prior from the class-
specific VAE-GANs; we attack 2500 test images.
On-manifold adversarial examples obtained through
Eq. (3) are similar to those crafted in [28], [82], [6] or [110].
However, in contrast to [28, 82, 6], we directly compute the
perturbation ζ on the manifold instead of computing the per-
turbation δ in the image space and subsequently projecting
x+δ to the manifold. Also note that enforcing any similarity
constraint through a norm on the manifold is significantly
more meaningful compared to using a norm on the image
space, as becomes apparent when comparing the obtained
on-manifold adversarial examples in Fig. 2 to their regular
counterparts. Compared to [110], we find on-manifold ad-
versarial examples using a gradient-based approach instead
of randomly sampling the latent space.
Fig. 2 shows on-manifold adversarial examples for all
datasets, which we found significantly harder to obtain
compared to their regular counterparts. On FONTS, us-
ing the true, known class manifolds, on-manifold adversar-
ial examples clearly correspond to transformations of the
original test image – reflecting the true latent space. For
the learned class manifolds, the perturbations are less pro-
nounced, often manipulating boldness or details of the char-
acters. Due to the approximate nature of the learned VAE-
GANs, these adversarial examples are strictly speaking not
always part of the true manifold – as can be seen for the
irregular “A” (Fig. 2, 6th column). On EMNIST and F-
MNIST, on-manifold adversarial examples represent mean-
ingful manipulations, such as removing the tail of a hand-
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Figure 4: Left: On-manifold adversarial examples can
be computed using learned, class-specific VAE-GANs [52,
75]. The perturbation ζ is obtained via Eq. (3) and added
to the latent code z = enc(x) yielding the adversarial ex-
ample x˜ = dec(z + ζ) with difference δ = x˜− x in image
space. Right: The distance of a regular adversarial example
x˜ to the manifold, approximated using nearest neighbors, is
computed as the distance to its orthogonal projection pi(x˜):
‖x˜ − pi(x˜)‖2. Large distances indicate that the adversarial
example likely left the manifold.
drawn “8” (Fig. 2, 10th column) or removing the collar of
a pullover (Fig. 2, 11th column), in contrast to the random
noise patterns of regular adversarial examples. However,
these usually incur a smaller change in the images space;
which also explains why regular, unconstrained adversar-
ial examples almost always leave the manifold. Still, on-
manifold adversarial examples are perceptually close to the
original images. On CelebA, the quality of on-manifold ad-
versarial examples is clearly limited by the approximation
quality of our VAE-GANs. Finally, Fig. 3 (right) shows that
on-manifold adversarial examples are closer to the manifold
than regular adversarial examples – in spite of the crude ap-
proximation of the manifold on EMNIST.
3.4. On-Manifold Robustness is Essentially
Generalization
We argue that on-manifold robustness is nothing differ-
ent than generalization: as on-manifold adversarial exam-
ples have non-zero probability under the data distribution,
they are merely generalization errors. This is shown in
Fig. 5 (top left) where test error and on-manifold success
rate on FONTS are shown. As expected, better generaliza-
tion, i.e., using more training images N , also reduces on-
manifold success rate. In order to make this relationship ex-
plicit, Fig. 5 (bottom) plots on-manifold success rate against
test error. Then, especially for FONTS and EMNIST, the re-
lationship of on-manifold robustness and generalization be-
comes apparent. On F-MNIST, the relationship is less pro-
nounced because on-manifold adversarial examples, com-
puted using our VAE-GANs, are not close enough to real
generalization errors. However, even on F-MNIST, the ex-
periments show a clear relationship between on-manifold
robustness and generalization.
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Figure 5: On-manifold robustness is strongly related to generalization, as shown on FONTS, EMNIST and F-MNIST con-
sidering on-manifold success rate and test error. Top: test error and on-manifold success rate in relation to the number of
training images. As test error reduces, so does on-manifold success rate. Bottom: on-manifold success rate plotted against
test error reveals the strong relationship between on-manifold robustness and generalization.
3.4.1 On-Manifold Adversarial Training
Boosts Generalization
Given that generalization positively influences on-manifold
robustness, we propose to adapt adversarial training to the
on-manifold case in order to boost generalization:
min
w
N∑
n=1
max
‖ζ‖∞≤η
L(f(dec(zn + ζ);w), yn). (4)
with zn = dec(xn) being the latent codes corresponding
to training images xn. Then, on-manifold adversarial train-
ing corresponds to robust optimization wrt. the true, or ap-
proximated, data distribution. For example, with the per-
fect decoder on FONTS, the inner optimization problem
finds “hard” images irrespective of their likelihood under
the data distribution. For approximate dec, the benefit of
on-manifold adversarial training depends on how well the
true data distribution is matched, i.e., how realistic the ob-
tained on-manifold adversarial examples are; in our case,
this depends on the quality of the learned VAE-GANs.
Instead of approximating the manifold using genera-
tive models, we can exploit known invariances of the data.
Then, adversarial training can be applied to these invari-
ances, assuming that they are part of the true manifold.
In practice, this can, for example, be accomplished us-
ing adversarial deformations [1, 105, 22], i.e., adversarially
crafted transformations of the image. For example, as on
FONTS, we consider 6-degrees-of-freedom transformations
corresponding to translation, shear, scaling and rotation:
min
w
N∑
n=1
max
‖t‖∞≤η,t∈R6
L(f(T (xn; t);w), yn). (5)
where T (x; t) denotes the transformation of image x with
parameters t and the η-constraint ensures similarity and la-
bel invariance. Again, the transformations can be applied
using spatial transformer networks [42] such that T is dif-
ferentiable; t can additionally be constrained to a reasonable
space of transformations. We note that a similar approach
has been used by Fawzi et al. [25] to boost generalization
on, e.g., MNIST [53]. However, the approach was consid-
ered as an adversarial variant of data augmentation and not
motivated through the lens of on-manifold robustness. We
refer to Eq. (5) as adversarial transformation training and
note that, on FONTS, this approach is equivalent to on-
manifold adversarial training as the transformations coin-
cide with the actual, true manifold by construction. We also
include a data augmentation baseline, where the transfor-
mations t are applied randomly.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of on-manifold adver-
sarial training in Fig. 5 (top). On FONTS, with access to
the true manifold, on-manifold adversarial training is able
to boost generalization significantly, especially for low N ,
i.e., few training images. Our VAE-GAN approximation
on FONTS seems to be good enough to preserve the ben-
efit of on-manifold adversarial training. On EMNIST and
F-MNIST, the benefit reduces with the difficulty of approx-
imating the manifold; this is the “cost” of imperfect approx-
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Figure 6: Regular robustness is not related to generalization, as demonstrated on FONTS, EMNIST and F-MNIST consider-
ing test error and (regular) success rate. On FONTS (left), success rate is not influenced by test error, except for adversarial
training. Plotting success rate against test error highlights the independence of robustness and generalization; however,
different training strategies exhibit different robustness-generalization characteristics.
imation. While the benefit is still significant on EMNIST, it
diminishes on F-MNIST. However, both on EMNIST and
F-MNIST, identifying invariances and utilizing adversar-
ial transformation training recovers the boost in generaliza-
tion; especially in contrast to the random data augmenta-
tion baseline. Overall, on-manifold adversarial training is a
promising tool for improving generalization and we expect
its benefit to increase with better generative models.
3.5. Regular Robustness is Independent of
Generalization
We argue that generalization, as measured on the mani-
fold wrt. the data distribution, is mostly independent of ro-
bustness against regular, possibly off-manifold, adversarial
examples when varying the amount of training data. Specif-
ically, in Fig. 6 (left) for FONTS, it can be observed that –
except for adversarial training – the success rate is invari-
ant to the test error. This can best be seen when plotting
the success rate against test error for different numbers of
training examples, cf. Fig. 6 (middle left): only for adver-
sarial training there exists a clear relationship; for the re-
maining training schemes success rate is barely influenced
by the test error. In particular, better generalization does
not worsen robustness. Similar behavior can be observed
on EMNIST and F-MNIST, see Fig. 6 (right). Here, it can
also be seen that different training strategies exhibit differ-
ent characteristics wrt. robustness and generalization. Over-
all, regular robustness and generalization are not necessarily
contradicting goals.
As mentioned in Section 1, these findings are in contrast
to related work [102, 95] claiming that an inherent trade-off
between robustness and generalization exists. For example,
Tsipras et al. [102] use a synthetic toy dataset to theoreti-
cally show that no model can be both robust and accurate
(on this dataset). However, they allow the adversary to pro-
duce perturbations that change the actual, true label wrt. the
data distribution, i.e., the considered adversarial examples
are not adversarial examples according to Def. 1. Thus, it is
unclear whether the suggested trade-off actually exists for
real datasets; our experiments, at least, as well as further
analysis in the supplementary material seem to indicate the
contrary. Similarly, Su et al. [95] experimentally show a
trade-off between adversarial robustness and generalization
by studying different models on ImageNet [79]. However,
Su et al. compare the robustness and generalization char-
acteristics of different models (i.e., different architectures,
training strategies etc.), while we found that the general-
ization performance does not influence robustness for any
arbitrary, but fixed model.
3.6. Discussion
Our results imply that robustness and generalization are
not necessarily conflicting goals, as believed in related work
[102, 95]. This means, in practice, for any arbitrary but
fixed model, better generalization will not worsen regular
robustness. Different models (architectures, training strate-
gies etc.) might, however, exhibit different robustness and
generalization characteristics, as also shown in [95, 77].
For adversarial training, on regular adversarial examples,
the commonly observed trade-off between robustness and
generalization is explained by the tendency of adversarial
examples to leave the manifold. As result, the network
has to learn (seemingly) random, but adversarial, noise pat-
terns in addition to the actual task at hand; rendering the
learning problem harder. On simple datasets, such as EM-
NIST, these adversarial directions might avoid overfitting;
on harder tasks, e.g., FONTS or F-MNIST, the discrepancy
in test error between normal and adversarial training in-
creases. Our results also support the hypothesis that regular
adversarial training has higher sample complexity [81, 46].
In fact, on FONTS, adversarial training can reach the same
accuracy as normal training with roughly twice the amount
of training data, as demonstrated in Fig. 7 (top). Further-
more, as illustrated in Fig. 7 (bottom), the trade-off between
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Figure 7: Adversarial training on regular adversarial exam-
ples, potentially leaving the manifold, renders the learn-
ing problem more difficult. Top: With roughly 1.5 to 2
times the training data, adversarial training can still reach
the same accuracy as normal training; results for ResNet-
13 [33]. Bottom: Additionally, the trade-off can be con-
trolled by combining regular and on-manifold adversarial
training; results averaged over 3 models.
regular robustness and generalization can be controlled by
combining regular and on-manifold adversarial training, i.e.
boost generalization while reducing robustness.
The presented results can also be confirmed on more
complex datasets, such as CelebA, and using different threat
models, i.e., attacks. On CelebA, where VAE-GANs have
difficulties approximating the manifold, Fig. 8 (top left)
shows that on-manifold robustness still improves with gen-
eralization although most on-manifold adversarial examples
are not very realistic, see Fig. 2. Similarly, regular robust-
ness, see Fig. 8 (top right), is not influenced by generaliza-
tion; here, we also show that the average distance of the per-
turbation, i.e., average ‖δ‖∞, when used to asses robustness
leads to the same conclusions. Similarly, as shown in Fig. 8
(bottom), our findings are confirmed using Carlini and Wag-
ner’s attack [14] with L2-norm – to show that the results
generalize across norms. However, overall, we observed
lower success rates using [14] and the L2 norm. Finally, our
results can also be reproduced using transfer attacks (i.e.,
black-box attacks, which are generally assumed to be sub-
sumed by white-box attacks [6]) as well as and different
architectures such as multi-layer perceptrons, ResNets [33]
and VGG [89], as detailed in the supplementary material.
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Figure 8: Results on CelebA and using the L2 Carlini and
Wagner [14] attack. On CelebA, as the class manifolds
are significantly harder to approximate, the benefit of on-
manifold adversarial training diminishes. For [14], we used
120 iterations; our hypotheses are confirmed, although [14]
does not use the training loss as attack objective and the L2
norm changes the similarity-constraint for regular and on-
manifold adversarial examples.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we intended to disentangle the relationship
between adversarial robustness and generalization by ini-
tially adopting the hypothesis that robustness and general-
ization are contradictory [102, 95]. By considering adver-
sarial examples in the context of the low-dimensional, un-
derlying data manifold, we formulated and experimentally
confirmed four assumptions. First, we showed that regular
adversarial examples indeed leave the manifold, as widely
assumed in related work [28, 99, 40, 72, 82]. Second, we
demonstrated that adversarial examples can also be found
on the manifold, so-called on-manifold adversarial exam-
ples; even if the manifold has to be approximated, e.g., us-
ing VAE-GANs [52, 75]. Third, we established that robust-
ness against on-manifold adversarial examples is clearly re-
lated to generalization. Our proposed on-manifold adver-
sarial training exploits this relationship to boost generaliza-
tion using an approximate manifold, or known invariances.
Fourth, we provided evidence that robustness against regu-
lar, unconstrained adversarial examples and generalization
are not necessarily contradicting goals: for any arbitrary but
fixed model, better generalization, e.g., through more train-
ing data, does not reduce robustness.
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Figure 9: For FONTS (left), EMNIST (middle) and F-MNIST (right), we show random samples from the learned, class-
specific VAE-GANs used to craft on-manifold adversarial examples. Our VAE-GANs generate realistic looking samples;
although we also include problematic samples illustrating the discrepancy between true and approximated data distribution.
A. Overview
In the main paper, we study the relationship between ad-
versarial robustness and generalization. Based on the dis-
tinction between regular and on-manifold adversarial exam-
ples, we show that 1. regular adversarial examples leave the
underlying manifold of the data; 2. on-manifold adversar-
ial examples exist; 3. on-manifold robustness is essentially
generalization; 4. and regular robustness is independent of
generalization. For clarity and brevity, the main paper fo-
cuses on the L∞ attack by Madry et al. [62] and the corre-
sponding adversarial training variant applied to simple con-
volutional neural networks. For on-manifold adversarial ex-
amples, we approximate the manifold using class-specific
VAE-GANs [52, 75]. In this document, we present compre-
hensive experiments demonstrating that our findings gener-
alize across attacks, adversarial training variants, network
architectures and to class-agnostic VAE-GANs.
A.1. Contents
In Section B, we present additional details regarding
our experimental setup, corresponding to Section 3.1 of the
main paper: in Section B.1, we discuss details of our syn-
thetic FONTS datasets and, in Section B.2, we discuss our
VAE-GAN implementation. Then, in Section C we extend
the discussion of Section 3.2 with further results demon-
strating that adversarial examples leave the manifold. Sub-
sequently, in Section D, we show and discuss additional
on-manifold adversarial examples to supplement the exam-
ples shown in Fig. 2 of the main paper. Then, comple-
menting the discussion in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, we consider
additional attacks, network architectures and class-agnostic
VAE-GANs. Specifically, in Section E, we consider the L2
variant of the white-box attack by Madry et al. [62], the L2
white-box attack by Carlini and Wagner [14], and black-box
transfer attacks. In Section F, we present experiments on
multi-layer perceptrons and, in Section G, we consider ap-
proximating the manifold using class-agnostic VAE-GANs.
In Section H, corresponding to Section 3.6, we consider dif-
ferent variants of regular and on-manifold adversarial train-
ing. Finally, in Section I, we discuss our definition of ad-
versarial examples in the context of related work by Tsipras
et al. [102], as outlined in Section 3.5.
B. Experimental Setup
We provide technical details on the introduced synthetic
FONTS dataset, Section B.1, and our VAE-GAN imple-
mentation, Section B.2.
B.1. FONTS Dataset
Our FONTS dataset consists of randomly rotated char-
acters “A” to “J” from different fonts, as outlined in Sec-
tion 3.1 of the main paper. Specifically, we consider
1000 Google Fonts as downloaded from the corresponding
GitHub repository1. We manually exclude fonts based on
symbols, or fonts that could not be rendered correctly in
order to obtain a cleaned dataset consisting of clearly read-
able letters “A” to “J”; still, the 1000 fonts exhibit significant
variance. The obtained, rendered letters are transformed us-
ing translation, shear, scaling and rotation: for each letter
and font, we create 112 transformations, uniformly sampled
in [−0.2, 0.2], [−0.5, 0.5], [0.75, 1.15], and [−pi/2, pi/2], re-
spectively. As a result, with 1000 fonts and 10 classes, we
obtain 1.12Mio images of size 28×28, splitted into 960k
training images and 160k test images (of which we use 40k
in the main paper); thus, the dataset has four times the size
of EMNIST [19]. For simplicity, the transformations are
1https://github.com/google/fonts
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Figure 10: On FONTS (left), EMNIST (middle) and F-MNIST (right) we plot the distance of adversarial examples to the
approximated manifold. We show normalized histograms of the L2 distance of adversarial examples to their projection, as
described in the text. Regular adversarial examples exhibit a significant distance to the manifold; clearly distinguishable
from on-manifold adversarial examples and test images. We also note that, depending on the VAE-GAN approximation,
on-manifold adversarial examples are hardly distinguishable from test images.
applied using a spatial transformer network [42] by assem-
bling translation [t1, t2], shear [λ1, λ2], scale s and rotation
r into an affine transformation matrix,[
cos(r)s− sin(r)sλ1 − sin(r)s+ cos(r)sλ1 t1
cos(r)sλ2 + sin(r)s − sin(r)sλ2 + cos(r)s t2
]
, (6)
making the generation process fully differentiable. Over-
all, FONTS offers full control over the manifold, i.e., the
transformation parameters, font and class, with differen-
tiable generative model, i.e., decoder.
B.2. VAE-GAN Variant
As briefly outlined in Section 3.1 of the main paper, we
use class-specific VAE-GANs [52, 75] to approximate the
class-manifolds on all datasets, i.e., FONTS, EMNIST [19],
F-MNIST [106] and CelebA [59]. In contrast to [52], how-
ever, we use a reconstruction loss on the image, not on the
discriminator’s features; in contrast to [75], we use the stan-
dard Kullback-Leibler divergence to regularize the latent
space. The model consists of an encoder enc, approximat-
ing the posterior q(z|x) ≈ p(z|x) of latent code z given
image x, a (deterministic) decoder dec, and a discrimina-
tor dis. During training, the sum of the following losses is
minimized:
Lenc = Eq(z|x) [λ‖x− dec(z)‖1] + KL(q(z|x)|p(z)) (7)
Ldec = Eq(z|x) [λ‖x− dec(z)‖1 − log(dis(dec(z)))] (8)
Ldis =− Ep(x) [log(dis(x))]
− Eq(z|x) [log(1− dis(dec(z)))]
(9)
using a standard Gaussian prior p(z). Here, q(z|x) is mod-
eled by predicting the mean µ(x) and variance σ2(x) such
that q(z|x) = N (z;µ(x), diag(σ2(x))) and the weighting
parameter λ controls the importance of the L1 reconstruc-
tion loss relative to the Kullback-Leibler divergence KL
and the adversarial loss for decoder and discriminator. As
in [48], we use the reparameterization trick with one sample
to approximate the expectations in Eq. (7), (8) and (9), and
the Kullback-Leibler divergence KL(q(z|x)|p(z)) is com-
puted analytically.
The encoder, decoder and discriminator consist of three
(four for CelebA) (de-) convolutional layers (4×4 kernels;
stride 2; 64, 128, 256 channels), followed by ReLU ac-
tivations and batch normalization [41]; the encoder uses
two fully connected layers to predict mean and variance;
the discriminator uses two fully connected layers to pre-
dict logits. We tuned λ to dataset- and class-specific val-
ues: on FONTS, λ = 3 worked well for all classes, on
EMNIST, λ = 2.5 except for classes “0” (λ = 2.75), “1”
(λ = 5.6) and “8” (λ = 2.25), on F-MNIST, λ = 2.75
worked well for all classes, on CelebA λ = 3 worked well
for both classes. Finally, we trained our VAE-GANs us-
ing ADAM [47] with learning rate 0.005 (decayed by 0.9
every epoch), weight decay 0.0001 and batch size 100 for
10, 30, 60 and 30 epochs on FONTS, EMNIST, F-MNIST
and CelebA, respectively. We also consider class-agnostic
VAE-GANs trained using the same strategy with λ = 3 for
FONTS, λ = 3 on EMNIST, λ = 2.75 on F-MNIST and
λ = 3 on CelebA, see Section G for results.
In Fig. 9, we include random samples of the class-
specific VAE-GANs. Especially on EMNIST and FONTS,
our VAE-GANs generate realistic looking samples with
sharp edges. However, we also show several problematic
random samples, illustrating the discrepancy between the
true data distribution and the approximation – as particu-
larly highlighted on FONTS.
C. Adversarial Example Distance to Manifold
Complementing Section 3.2 of the main paper, we pro-
vide additional details and results regarding the distance of
regular adversarial examples to the true or approximated
manifold, including a theoretical argument of adversarial
examples leaving the manifold.
On FONTS, with access to the true manifold in form of
a perfect decoder dec, we iteratively obtain the latent code
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Figure 11: Regular and on-manifold adversarial examples on FONTS, EMNIST, F-MNIST and CelebA. On FONTS, the
manifold is known; on the other datasets, class manifolds have been approximated using VAE-GANs. Notice that the crafted
on-manifold adversarial examples correspond to meaningful manipulations of the image – as long as the learned class-
manifolds are good approximations. This can best be seen considering the (normalized) difference images (or the magnitude
thereof for CelebA).
z˜ yielding the manifold’s closest image to the given adver-
sarial example x˜ as
z˜ = argmin
z
‖x˜− dec(z)‖22. (10)
We use 100 iterations of ADAM [47], with a learning rate of
0.09, decayed every 10 iterations by a factor 0.95. We found
that additional iterations did not improve the results. The
obtained projection pi(x˜) = dec(z˜) is usually very close to
the original test image x for which the adversarial example
was crafted. The distance is then computed as ‖x˜−pi(x˜)‖2;
we refer to the main paper for results and discussion.
If the true manifold is not available, we locally approx-
imate the manifold using 50 nearest neighbors x1, . . . , x50
of the adversarial example x˜. In the main paper, we center
these nearest neighbors at the test image x, i.e., consider the
sub-space spanned by xi−x. Here, we show that the results
can be confirmed when centering the nearest neighbors at
their mean x¯ = 1/50
∑50
i=1 xi and considering the subspace
spanned by xi − x¯ instead. In this scenario, the test image
x is not necessarily part of the approximated manifold any-
more. The projection onto this sub-space can be obtained by
solving the least squares problem; specifically, we consider
the vector δ = x˜ − x, i.e., we assume that the “adversarial
direction” originates at the mean x¯. Then, we solve
β∗ = argmin
β
‖Xβ − δ‖22 (11)
where the columns Xi are the vectors xi − x¯. The projec-
tion pi(x˜) is obtained as pi(x˜) = Xβ∗; the same approach
can be applied to projecting the test image x. Note that it
is crucial to consider the adversarial direction δ itself, in-
stead of the adversarial example x˜ because ‖δ‖2 is small
by construction, i.e., the projections of x˜ and x are very
close. In Fig. 10, we show results using this approximation
on FONTS, EMNIST and F-MNIST. Regular adversarial
examples can clearly be distinguished from test images and
on-manifold adversarial examples. Note, however, that we
assume access to both the test image x and the correspond-
ing adversarial example x˜ such that this finding cannot be
exploited for detection. We also notice that the discrepancy
between the distance distributions of test images and on-
manifold adversarial examples reflects the approximation
quality of the used VAE-GANs.
C.1. Intuition and Theoretical Argument
Having empirically shown that regular adversarial exam-
ples tend to leave the manifold, often in a nearly orthogonal
direction, we also discuss a theoretical argument supporting
this observation. The main assumption is that the training
loss is constant on the manifold (normally close to zero) due
to training and proper generalization, i.e., low training and
test loss. Thus, the loss gradient is approximately orthog-
onal to the manifold as this is the direction to increase the
loss most efficiently.
More formally, let f(x) denote the classifier which – for
simplicity – takes inputs x ∈ Rd and predicts outputs y ∈
RK for K classes. We assume both the classifier as well as
the used loss, e.g., cross-entropy loss, to be differentiable.
We further expect the data to lie on a manifoldM and the
loss to be constant onM∩B(x, ) with
B(x, ) = {x′ ∈ Rd : ‖x′ − x‖ ≤ }. (12)
Let
g(x) = E [L(f(x), y)|x] (13)
be the conditional expectation of the loss L; then, by the
mean value theorem, there exists θ(x′) ∈ [0, 1] for each
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Figure 12: L2 attacks of Madry et al. [62] and Carlini and Wagner [14] on FONTS, EMNIST and F-MNIST. In all cases,
we plot regular or on-manifold success rate against test error. Independent of the attack, we can confirm that on-manifold
robustness is strongly related to generalization, while regular robustness is independent of generalization.
x′ ∈M∩B(x, ) such that
0 = g(x′)− g(x) (14)
= 〈∇g(θ(x′)x+ (1− θ(x′))x′), x′ − x〉 (15)
As this holds for all  > 0 and as → 0, every vector x′−x
becomes a tangent ofM at x and
lim
→0
∇g(θ(x′)x+ (1− θ(x′))x′) = ∇g(x), (16)
it holds that ∇g(x) is orthogonal to the tangent space of
M at x. As ∇g(x) is the gradient of the expected loss,
it implies that adversarial examples, as computed, e.g., us-
ing first-order gradient-based approaches such as Eq. (17),
leave the manifoldM in order to fool the classifier f(x).
D. On-Manifold Adversarial Examples
In Fig. 11, we show additional examples of regular and
on-manifold adversarial examples, complementing the ex-
amples in Fig. 2 of the main paper. On FONTS, both using
the true and the approximated manifold, on-manifold ad-
versarial examples reflect the underlying invariances of the
data, i.e., the transformations employed in the generation
process. This is in contrast to the corresponding regular ad-
versarial examples and their (seemingly) random noise pat-
terns. We note that regular and on-manifold adversarial ex-
amples can best be distinguished based on their difference
to the original test image – although both are perceptually
close to the original image. Similar observations hold on
EMNIST and F-MNIST. However, especially on F-MNIST
and CelebA, the discrepancy between true images and on-
manifold adversarial examples becomes visible. This is
the “cost” of approximating the underlying manifold using
VAE-GANs. More examples can be found in Fig. 21 at the
end of this document.
E. L2 and Transfer Attacks
In the main paper, see Section 3.1, we primarily focus
on the L∞ white-box attack by Madry et al. [62]. Here, we
further consider the L2 variant, which, given image x with
label y and classifier f , maximizes the training loss, i.e.,
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Figure 13: Transfer attacks on FONTS, EMNIST and F-
MNIST. We show on-manifold (left) and regular success
rate (right) plotted against test error. In spite of significantly
lower success rates, transfer attacks also allow to confirm
the strong relationship between on-manifold success rate
and test error, while – at least on FONTS and EMNIST–
regular success rate is independent of test error.
max
δ
L(f(x+ δ), y) s.t. ‖δ‖2 ≤ , x˜i ∈ [0, 1], (17)
to obtain an adversarial example x˜ = x + δ. We use  =
1.5 for regular adversarial examples and  = 0.3 for on-
manifold adversarial examples. For optimization, we utilize
projected ADAM [47]: after each iteration, x˜ is projected
onto the L2-ball of radius  using
x˜′ = x˜ ·max
(
1,

‖x˜‖2
)
(18)
and clipped to [0, 1]. We use a learning rate of 0.005 and we
note that ADAM includes momentum, as suggested in [21].
Optimization stops as soon as the label changes, or runs for
a maximum of 40 iterations. The perturbation δ is initialized
randomly as follows:
δ = u
δ′
‖δ′‖2 , δ
′ ∼ N (0, I), u ∼ U(0, 1). (19)
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Figure 14: Distance of Carlini+Wagner adversarial exam-
ples to the true, on FONTS (left), or approximated, on EM-
NIST (right), manifold. As before, we show normalized
histograms of the L2 distance of adversarial examples to
their projections onto the manifold. Even for different at-
tacks and the L2 norm, regular adversarial examples seem
to leave the manifold.
Here, U(0, 1) refers to the uniform distribution over [0, 1].
This results in δ being in the -ball and uniformly distributed
over distance and direction. Note that this is in contrast
to sampling uniformly wrt. the volume of the -ball. The
same procedure applies to the L∞ attack where the projec-
tion onto the -ball is achieved by clipping. The attack can
also be used to obtain on-manifold adversarial examples,
as described in Section 3.3 of the main paper. Then, opti-
mization in Eq. (17) is done over the perturbation ζ in latent
space, with constraint ‖ζ‖2 ≤ η. The adversarial example
is obtained as x˜ = dec(z+ζ) with z being the latent code of
image x and dec being the true or approximated generative
model, i.e., decoder.
We also consider the L2 white box attack by Carlini and
Wagner [14]. Instead of directly maximizing the training
loss, Carlini and Wagner propose to use a surrogate objec-
tive on the classifier’s logits ly:
F (x˜, y) = max(−κ, ly(x˜)−max
y′ 6=y
ly′(x˜)). (20)
Compared to the training loss, which might be close to zero
for a well-trained network, F is argued to provide more use-
ful gradients [14]. Then,
min
δ
F (x+ δ, y) + λ‖δ‖2 s.t. x˜i ∈ [0, 1] (21)
is minimized by reparameterizing δ in terms of δ =
1/2(tanh(ω)+1)−x in order to ensure the image-constraint,
i.e., x˜i ∈ [0, 1]. In practice, we empirically chose κ = 1.5,
use 120 iterations of ADAM [47] with learning rate 0.005
and λ = 1. Again, this attack can be used to obtain on-
manifold adversarial examples, as well.
As black-box attack we transfer L∞ Madry adversarial
examples from a held out model, as previously done in [58,
108, 70]. The held out transfer model is trained normally,
i.e., without any data augmentation or adversarial training,
on 10k training images for 20 epochs (as outlined in Section
3.1 of the main paper). The success rate of these transfer
attacks is computed with respect to images that are correctly
classified by both the transfer model and the target model.
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Figure 15: Experiments with multilayer-perceptrons on
FONTS, EMNIST and F-MNIST. We plot on-manifold
(left) or regular success rate (right) against test error. On-
manifold robustness is strongly related to generalization,
while regular robustness seems mostly independent of gen-
eralization.
Extending the discussion of Sections 3.4 and 3.5 of the
main paper, Fig. 12 shows results on FONTS, EMNIST and
F-MNIST considering both L2 attacks, i.e., Madry et al.
[62] and Carlini and Wagner [14]. In contrast to the L∞
Madry attack, we observe generally lower success rates.
Nevertheless, we can observe a clear relationship between
on-manifold success rate and test error. The exact form of
this relationship, however, depends on the attack; for the L2
Madry attack, the relationships seems to be mostly linear
(especially on FONTS and EMNIST), while it seems non-
linear for the L2 Carlini and Wagner attack. Furthermore,
the independence of regular robustness and generalization
can be confirmed, i.e., regular success rate is roughly con-
stant when test error varies – again, with the exception of
regular adversarial training. Finally, for completeness, in
Fig. 14, we illustrate that the Carlini+Wagner L2 attack also
results in regular adversarial examples leaving the manifold.
In Fig. 13, we also consider the black-box case, i.e.,
without access to the target model. While both observations
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Figure 16: Experiments with ResNet-13 (top) and VGG
(bottom) on FONTS and F-MNIST. We plot on-manifold
(left) or regular success rate (right) against test error. As
in Fig. 15, our claims can be confirmed for these network
architectures, as well.
from above can be confirmed, especially on FONTS and
EMNIST, the results are significantly less pronounced. This
is mainly due to the significantly lower success rate of trans-
fer attacks – both regarding regular and on-manifold ad-
versarial examples. Especially on EMNIST and F-MNIST,
success rate may reduce from previously 80% or higher to
10% or lower. This might also explain the high variance
on EMNIST and F-MNIST regarding regular robustness.
Overall, we demonstrate that our claims can be confirmed in
both white- and black-box settings as well as using different
attacks [62, 14] and norms.
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Figure 17: On-manifold adversarial examples crafted us-
ing class-agnostic VAE-GANs on EMNIST. We show ex-
amples illustrating the problematic of unclear class bound-
aries within the learned manifold. On-manifold adversarial
examples are not guaranteed to be label invariant, i.e., they
may change the actual, true label according to the approxi-
mate data distribution.
F. Influence of Network Architecture
Also in relation to the discussion in Sections 3.4 and
3.5 of the main paper, Fig. 15 shows results on FONTS,
EMNIST and F-MNIST using multi-layer perceptrons in-
stead of convolutional neural networks. Specifically, we
consider a network with 4 hidden layers, using 128 hid-
den units each; each layer is followed by ReLU activations
and batch normalization [41]; training strategy, however, re-
mains unchanged. Both of our claims, i.e., that on-manifold
robustness is essentially generalization but regular robust-
ness is independent of generalization, can be confirmed. Es-
pecially regarding the latter, results are more pronounced
using multi-layer perceptrons: except for regular adversar-
ial training, success rate stays nearly constant at 100% ir-
respective of test error. Overall, these results suggest that
our claims generally hold for the class of (deep) neural net-
works, irrespective of architectural details.
In order to further validate our claims, we also consider
variants of two widely used, state-of-the-art architectures:
ResNet-13 [33] and VGG [89]. For VGG, however, we
removed the included dropout layers. The main reason is
that randomization might influence robustness, e.g., see [6].
Additionally, we only use 2 stages of model A, see [89],
in order to deal with the significantly lower resolution of
28 × 28 on FONTS, EMNIST and F-MNIST; finally, we
only use 1024 hidden units in the fully connected layers.
Fig. 16 shows results on FONTS and F-MNIST (which are
significantly more difficult than EMNIST) confirming our
claims.
G. From Class Manifolds to Data Manifold
In the context of Sections 3.3 and 3.4 of the main pa-
per, we consider approximating the manifold using class-
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Figure 18: Test error and on-data-manifold success rate on
FONTS and EMNIST. Using class-agnostic VAE-GANs,
without clear class boundaries, on-manifold adversarial
training looses its effectiveness – the on-manifold adver-
sarial examples cross the true class boundaries too often.
The strong relationship between on-manifold robustness
and generalization can still be confirmed.
agnostic VAE-GANs. Instead of the class-conditionals
p(x|y) of the data distribution, the marginals p(x) are ap-
proximated, i.e., images of different classes are embedded
in the same latent space. Then, however, ensuring label in-
variance, as required by our definition of on-manifold ad-
versarial examples, becomes difficult:
Definition 2 (On-Manifold Adversarial Example). Given
the data distribution p, an on-manifold adversarial exam-
ple for x with label y is a perturbed version x˜ such that
f(x˜) 6= y but p(y|x˜) > p(y′|x˜)∀y′ 6= y.
Therefore, we attempt to ensure Def. 2 through a particu-
larly small L∞-constraint on the perturbation, specifically
‖ζ‖∞ ≤ η with η = 0.1 where ζ is the perturbation ap-
plied in the latent space. Still, as can be seen in Fig. 17,
on-manifold adversarial examples might cross class bound-
aries, i.e., they change their actual label rendering them in-
valid according to our definition.
In Fig. 18, we clearly distinguish between on-class-
manifold and on-data-manifold adversarial training, cor-
responding to the used class-specific or -agnostic VAE-
GANs. Robustness, however, is measured wrt. on-data-
manifold adversarial examples. As can be seen, the positive
effect of on-manifold adversarial training diminishes when
using on-data-manifold adversarial examples during train-
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Figure 19: Adversarial training variants and baselines on
FONTS and EMNIST. For adversarial training, we consider
the full variant, i.e., training on 100% adversarial examples,
and the weak variant, i.e., stopping the inner optimization
problem of Eq. (22) as son as the first adversarial example
is found. For regular adversarial training, the strength of the
adversary determines the robustness-generalization trade-
off; for on-manifold adversarial training, the ideal strength
depends on the approximation quality of the used VAE-
GANs.
ing. Both, on FONTS and EMNIST, generalization slightly
decreases in comparison to normal training because adver-
sarial examples are not useful for learning the task if la-
bel invariance cannot be ensured. When evaluating robust-
ness against on-data-manifold adversarial examples, how-
ever, the relation of on-data-manifold robustness to gener-
alization can clearly be seen. Overall, this shows that this
relationship also extends to more general, less strict defini-
tions of on-manifold adversarial examples.
H. Baselines and Adversarial Training Vari-
ants
In the main paper, see Section 3.1, we consider the ad-
versarial training variant by Madry et al. [62], i.e.,
min
w
N∑
n=1
max
‖δ‖∞≤
L(f(xn + δ;w), yn), (22)
where f is the classifier with weights w, L is the cross-
entropy loss and xn, yn are training images and labels. In
contrast to [62], we train on 50% clean and 50% adversar-
ial examples [97, 31]. The inner optimization problem is
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Figure 20: Illustration of the toy dataset considered by
Tsipras et al. in [102] and defined in Eq. (26). For labels
y = 1 and y = −1, the two-dimensional observations
x ∈ {−1, 1}×R are plotted. The first dimension, i.e., x1,
mirrors the label with probability 0.9; the second dimen-
sion, i.e., x2, is drawn from a Gaussian N (y3, I), i.e., η
from the text is 3. As illustrated on the left, perturbing an
observation x with label y = 1 but x1 = −1 by 2η = 6
results in an adversarial example x˜ indistinguishable from
observations with label y = −1.
run for full 40 iterations, as described in Section E without
early stopping. Here, we additionally consider the full vari-
ant, i.e., training on 100% adversarial examples; and the
weak variant, i.e., stopping the inner optimization problem
as soon as the label changes. Additionally, we consider ran-
dom perturbations as baseline, i.e., choosing the perturba-
tions δ uniformly at random without any optimization. The
same variants and baselines apply to on-manifold adversar-
ial training and adversarial transformation training.
In Section 3.6 of the main paper, we observed that dif-
ferent training strategies might exhibit different robustness-
generalization characteristics. For example, regular adver-
sarial training renders the learning problem harder: in addi-
tion to the actual task, the network has to learn (seemingly)
random but adversarial noise directions leaving the mani-
fold. In Fig. 19, we first show that training on randomly per-
turbed examples (instead of adversarially perturbed ones)
is not effective, neither in image space nor in latent space.
This result highlights the difference between random and
adversarial noise, as also discussed in [24]. For regular ad-
versarial training, the strength of the adversary primarily
influences the robustness-generalization trade-off; for ex-
ample, the weak variant increases generalization while re-
ducing robustness. Note that this effect also depends on
the difficulty of the task, e.g., FONTS is considerably more
difficult than EMNIST. For on-manifold adversarial train-
ing, in contrast, the different variants have very little effect;
generalization is influenced only slightly, while regular ro-
bustness is – as expected – not influenced.
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Figure 21: Regular and on-manifold adversarial examples on FONTS, EMNIST, F-MNIST and CelebA. On FONTS, the
manifold is known; otherwise, class manifolds have been approximated using VAE-GANs. In addition to the original test
images, we also show the adversarial examples and their (normalized) difference (or the magnitude thereof for CelebA).
I. Definition of Adversarial Examples
Adversarial examples are assumed to be label-invariant,
i.e., the actual, true label does not change. For images, this
is usually enforced using a norm-constraint on the perturba-
tion – e.g., cf. Eq. (17); on other modalities, however, this
norm-constraint might not be sufficient. In Section 3.3 of
the main paper, we provide a definition for on-manifold ad-
versarial examples based on the true, underlying data distri-
bution – as restated in Def. 2. Here, we use this definition to
first discuss a simple and intuitive example before consider-
ing the theoretical argument of [102], claiming that robust
and accurate models are not possible on specific datasets;
an argument in contradiction to our results
Let the observations x and labels y be drawn from a data
distribution p, i.e., x, y ∼ p(x, y). Then, given a classifier
f we define adversarial examples as follows:
Definition 3 (Adversarial Example). Given the data dis-
tribution p, an adversarial example for x with label y is
a perturbed version x˜ such that f(x˜) 6= y but p(y|x˜) >
p(y′|x˜)∀y′ 6= y.
In words, adversarial examples must not change the actual,
true label wrt. the data distribution. Note that this definition
is identical to Def. 2 for on-manifold adversarial examples.
For the following toy examples, however, the data distribu-
tion has non-zero probability on the whole domain or we
only consider adversarial examples x˜ with p(x˜) > 0 such
that Def. 3 is well-defined. We leave a more general defini-
tion of adversarial examples for future work.
We illustrate Def. 3 on an intuitive, binary classification
task. Specifically, the classes y = 1 and y = −1 are uni-
formly distributed, i.e., p(y = 1) = p(y = −1) = 0.5 and
observations are drawn from point masses on 0 and :
p(x = 0|y = 1) = 1 (23)
p(x = |y = −1) = 1 (24)
This problem is linearly separable for any  > 0; however, it
seems that no classifier will be adversarially robust against
perturbations of absolute value . For simplicity, we con-
sider the observation x = 0 with y = 1 and the adversarial
example x˜ = x +  = . Then, verifying Def. 3 yields a
contradiction:
0 = p(y = 1|x = ) 6> p(y = −1|x = ) = 1. (25)
It turns out, x˜ =  is not a proper adversarial example. This
example illustrates that an exact definition of adversarial ex-
amples, e.g., Def. 3, is essential to study the robustness of
such toy datasets.
I.1. Discussion of [102]
In [102], Tsipras et al. argue that there exists an inher-
ent trade-off between regular robustness and generalization
based on a slightly more complex toy example; we follow
the notation in [102]. Specifically, for labels y = 1 and
y = −1 with p(y = 1) = p(y = −1) = 0.5, the observa-
tions x ∈ {−1, 1}×R are drawn as follows2:
p(x1|y) =
{
p if x1 = y
1− p if x1 = −y
,
p(x2|y) = N (x2; yη, 1)
(26)
where η defines the degree of overlapping between the two
classes and p ≥ 0.5. Fig. 20 illustrates this dataset for p =
0.9 and η = 3. For a L∞-bounded adversary with  ≥ 2η,
Tsipras et al. show that no model can be both accurate and
robust. Specifically, for x with y = 1 but x1 = −1 and
x2 = η, we consider replacing x2 with x˜2 = x2 − 2η =
−η, as considered in [102]. However, this adversary does
not produce proper adversarial examples according to our
definition. Indeed,
2Note that, for simplicity and convenience, we consider the 2-
dimensional case; Tsipras et al. consider the general D-dimensional case,
where x1 remains unchanged and x2, . . . , xD are drawn from the corre-
sponding Gaussian, cf. (26).
p(y = 1|x = x˜)
= p(y = 1|x1 = −1) · p(y = 1|x2 = −η)
= (1− p) · N (x2 = −η; η, 1)
6> p · N (x2 = −η;−η, 1)
= p(y = −1|x1 = −1) · p(y = −1|x2 = −η)
= p(y = −1|x = x˜)
(27)
which contradicts our definition. Thus, in light of Def. 3, the
suggested trade-off of Tsipras et al. is questionable. How-
ever, we note that this argument explicitly depends on our
definition of proper and invalid adversarial examples, i.e.,
Def. 3; other definitions of adversarial examples or adver-
sarial robustness, e.g., in the context of the adversarial loss
defined in [102], may lead to different conclusions.
